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CROSS-OBSERVATIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATION
OF CIVIL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
AND FRANCE
GEORGE W. PUGH*

Find the facts, and to these facts, apply the law. This, it seems, is
the essence of our judicial process. That the task be accomplished justly,
speedily, and inexpensively is a "consummation devoutly to be wished,"
and since the "twenties" significant progress has been made. However,
popular (as well as professional) dissatisfaction with the administration
of justice' persists, as indeed it should, for we are still far from our announced goal-the "just, speedy and inexpensive"2 determination of
controversies.
Perhaps continued comparative procedural studies will aid in the
fashioning of further procedural reforms: certainly the problem of
fact-finding and law-applying is not peculiar to the American system.
Whether particular procedural devices which have proved successful
in foreign contexts would be effective or desirable in the American
environment, in light of our different traditions and expectations, is
not necessarily determinative of whether the studies themselves will be
useful. From consideration of other systems, we should gain better insight into our own-its strengths and weaknesses-and thereby, perhaps,
learn where improvements are needed and how they can be effectively
made.
In addition, cogent observations concerning our own system by
competent and perceptive foreign observers may afford further insight.
From this opportunity to see ourselves as others see us, our understanding of our own institutions, methods, and motivations may be enhanced, and our powers of self-evaluation sharpened.
UNITED STATES

Not long before the great procedural reforms which began in the
"thirties," a distinguished French practitioner and scholar, Mr. Pierre
LePaulle, studied the administration of justice in the United States.
A sharp critic of judicial administration in his own country,8 Mr.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. This article was prepared by the author
for The Comparative Study of the Administration of Justice, established under the terms
of a grant from the Ford Foundation to Loyola University School of Law (Chicago), and
was written while the author was in France for research. It is published here with the
consent of the Study, which reserves all rights.

1. See Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).
2. See FED. R. Civ. P., Rule 1.
3. LEPAuLLE, LA JUSTICE (Payot, Paris, 1934).
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LePaulle was, however, less than enthusiastic about American counterparts.' His tart observations have for us an arresting, and perhaps instructive, significance. In 1928, Mr. LePaulle wrote:
When a lawyer of the Continent comes for the first time to
America, he is usually full of admiration for the administration of justice in the United States. He sees "efficiency" and
"service" written and worshiped everywhere, his imagination
begins to work, and he thinks immediately of American courts
like small Ford factories, where rights are recognized, set in
motion, sanctioned in less time than is necessary to build a
"flivver." Then he enters into a courtroom. .

.

. Instead of

looking at a trial conducted as a business meeting, with all the
work prepared by well-trained specialists, what does he see?
That nothing has been done before the trial to ascertain the
facts; that oral evidence is seriously considered as reliable;
nayl that such evidence is gathered not by a critical and impartial inquiry, but by squeezing the witness through the
theatrical scheme of cross-examination; that the inquiry is
conducted by lawyers who are not interested in the discovery
of the truth, but, to say the least, in a certain presentation of
the facts; that abstract rules, called evidence (!I), decide a
priori what is relevant or not, what can be proven or not; that
a stenographer takes down all that is said at the trial and
makes it eventually one or several volumes.
The Civil Law lawyer does not require so much to be out of
breath. But, when he sees that complicated sets of facts must
be decided by the wife of the plumber, the bootblack, his
chambermaid, and nine other picturesque citizens, then he has
a fit.5
Mr. LePaulle, however, did more than merely criticize; he put
forward a number of suggestions for reform. Although many Americans
would thoroughly disagree with Mr. LePaulle's controversial proposals,
nevertheless his recommendations, coming as they do from a perceptive
foreign practitioner, are worthy of consideration. His reflections not
only afford insight into our own system, but also give somewhat of an
introduction to the French system, which to some extent provided his
frame of reference. Mr. LePaulle readily recognized that Constitutional
limitations and the attitudes and psychology of the American people
might well be a barrier to his proposals, but pretermitting these factors,
he suggested in part:
1. Suppress the jury in all private law cases. Its existence
at present is nothing but a historical nonsense and a miscon4. LePaulle, Administration of Justice in the United States, 4 WEST PUBLISING
3192 (Oct.-Nov. 1928), hereafter quoted with kind permission of Mr.
LePaulle and the publisher.
COMPANY'S DOCKET

5. Ibid.
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ception of democracy. A competent, well-trained, and impartial
judge should decide both law and facts. Instead of having
sentiment, incompetency, and theatrical show up in the courtroom, try to make of your trials a businesslike meeting in a
conference room.
2. Suppress the rules of evidence, at least in the measure
in which they have not become rules of substantive law. When
you have a competent man to determine the fact, he will know
what is relevant. The lawyers will soon realize that he knows,
and they will act accordingly. That suppression would bring
in the law less technicality and more realism.
3. Refuse to admit oral testimony when you have sufficient written evidence. Be aware of the works of modern psychologists showing that witnesses of complete good faith do
not frequently tell the truth, even whey they have a critical
mind.
4. Let the parties prescribe by writing before the trial the
facts they want to prove by witnesses. It avoids a terrible
waste of time during the examination.
5. Forbid the lawyers to see the witnesses at any time
before the trial; you will get more truth, and will get it more
easily.
6. Impose higher penalties on perjury.
7. Let the judge examine the witnesses, and allow the
lawyers to ask him to put additional questions. Let an impartial, intelligent, and well-trained judge seek for the truth,
and you will realize how much quicker and more efficient that
method of getting the facts is.
8. Oblige the lawyers to communicate the written evidence
they have to their colleagues on the other side, in order to
avoid the element of surprise that goes with the psychology of
a trial by battle, but not of a businesslike meeting.
9. Have only one way to review a decision, a trial de
novo; but have it as a matter of right, as a second chance
given to the loser. Never try to do the impossible in going
into the history of the first trial; suppress the stenographer's
record of the proceeding; try over again, before several judges
of a higher grade, both law and facts, but do it in a snappy
way.
10. Keep your judges away from politics and too direct
pressure of public opinion. Elect them, if you want, but for
life.
11. Have, in each state, a compulsory organization of the
Bar, having a strong control on the moral and intellectual
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standards of the lawyers. You will never have a quick and
efficient procedure, if the lawyer does not understand what are
the only essential points in his case, and if the judge cannot
have complete confidence in the counsel.'
Of course, the foregoing comments were made, not with respect
to American civil procedure of today, but to that of the "twenties."
Did the great American procedural reforms of the "thirties," and
following, take the path this foreign observer was outling for us?
It appears that to a considerable extent, our recent procedural reforms
(as well as many of our current proposals for further reform) were
designed to remedy the procedural evils he detected and decried. Often
the steps actually taken differed widely from those he was urging, but
the similarity of overall thrust seems worthy of note. Mr. LePaulle's
suggestions were mainly aimed at reducing the "game" and "surprise"
elements in the American judicial process, and this is surely the path
we have been following.
Mr. LePaulle's first and fundamental proposal, the abolition of
the jury in all private law cases, has, of course, not been adopted. The
jury is deeply rooted in our traditions, expectations, and law. Our substantive law, which has been moulded by its procedural shell, would
take on a very different meaning if the procedural context in which it
grew and developed were suddently deprived of the jury-one of its
most characteristic aspects. With respect to personal injury litigation
(where our problems of administration of civil justice are particularly
acute), suggestions for jury suppression are increasingly heard. In the
opinion of this writer, this simple expedient would not provide the
panacea; much more pervasive changes in both substantive and adjective law are needed.
Mr. LePaulle's second proposal (the suppression of the rules of
evidence) is closely related to the first (the elimination of the jury in
private law cases). Since the "twenties," there has been more and more
realization that our technical rules of evidence are too technical, even
in the context of jury trial. The creative efforts of leading authorities
on the law of evidence, the American Law Institute's Model Code, and
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, all point towards broader admissibility.
Current efforts towards uniform rules for Federal Courts would, if
pursued to fruition, undoubtedly follow this trend.
Mr. LePaulle's third suggestion-that we refuse to admit oral
testimony when there is "sufficient" written evidence-reflects French
disenchantment with oral testimony. The French view in this regard
perhaps results in part from the fact that examination and cross-examination by counsel, as we know it, is nonexistent in French judicial
6. Id. at 3194.
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procedure. In the absence of this formidable weapon to test the verity
and accuracy of oral testimony, it is no wonder that the French fear
it. Although there is no movement in the United States to reject oral
testimony, the psychological studies to which Mr. LePaulle referred
have had their impact. There are strong voices urging that, despite the
hearsay rule, there should be much greater liberality in the admissibility
of contemporary writings. This movement aims towards the admissibility
of helpful written evidence, not the exclusion of relevant oral testimony.
The fifth suggestion (that lawyers be prohibited from interviewing
witnesses before the trial) and the seventh (that the judge rather than
the lawyer conduct the examination) are linked to each other, and
further reflect the French distrust of oral testimony noted above. These
radical suggestions have surely not been adopted in the United States.
Their adoption might well bring more difficulties than we presently
encounter. Examination and cross-examination in our traditional adversary proceedings afford cherished protection and a very strong weapon
against false claims and false accusations. But this does not necessarily mean that our adversary system is beyond improvement. This
writer does not believe that we should close our eyes to the fact that
coloration often does result from the witness interview, that a witness's
recollection frequently does fade with the long passage of time that
often occurs between event and testimony, and that the pattern of
direct and cross-examination at times does make it difficult for a
witness to "tell his story." If we really want to get the actual facts of
an automobile accident, might we not consider the possibility of a tape
recording of an inquiry conducted immediately after the accident by an
impartial, trained public official-before any witness is interviewed by
counsel or insurance adjustors? The hearsay rule as presently constituted would, of course, normally bar the use of such a recording if
introduced for its substantive weight-but the hearsay rule could be
modified. Would the recording not be of inestimable value in finding
the true facts-if that is really what we want? There are difficulties,
to be sure, but the idea seems worthy of exploration, and possibly
implementation.
As noted above, Mr. LePaulle's fifth and seventh proposals strike
at the core of our traditional adversary system. Few of us are likely to
feel that it should be thus undermined, but in frank self-appraisal of
our own institutions, we must consider whether at times we are carried
*away, and astray, by unbridled application of the system-failing to
delimit adequately its appropriate ambit. This is perhaps particularly
apparent with respect to our use (or more properly, abuse) of the
erudition of experts in this increasingly scientific world. The French
have long employed court-appointed impartial experts, and their experience with the institution certainly commends it to our further use
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and experimentation to evolve the most satisfactory system for the
American setting. Long steps forward have already been taken and our
cross-examination by counsel affords a significant safeguard against the
partial or incompetent "impartial" expert. There is so much wellgrounded dissatisfaction with the traditional adversary expert system,
that some changes, at least, are surely indicated.
Mr. LePaulle's sixth suggestion-that our punishment for perjury
be increased-probably again reflects French fear of oral testimony.
The writer is unaware of any general change in our penalties for
perjury.' It is probable that in both countries much more false swearing
actually takes place than we are willing to admit, and that we are all far
too apathetic. Improvement in attitude of bench, bar and public, and
prompt and zealous perjury prosecution (rather than increases in prescribed penalties), are probably needed.'
Our great advances in the area of pretrial, deposition and discovery
have done much to obviate the "surprise" and "gamesmanship" aspects of American trial practice, towards which Mr. LePaulle's fourth
and eighth proposals were especially directed. Although our trials have
certainly not yet taken on the business conference atmosphere he envisioned, much progress has been made. American discovery practice
now generally has broader scope than the French counterpart, and with
good results.
Trial de novo on appeal as a matter of right, a much prized institution in French civil procedure, is urged by Mr. LePaulle as his
ninth suggestion. Its presence in French practice is understandable in
the context of France's civil procedure generally. Its absence from
American procedure, and its nonfeasibility here, is likewise to be explained in light of other very basic procedural institutions, particularly
the jury and our system of oral testimony. As we have seen, Mr. LePaulle
was urging radical alterations with respect to both of these characteristic institutions, changes which have not been made.
The last two of the quoted recommendations of Mr. LePaulle were
directed towards achieving a politically independent Bench, and a
stronger, well-organized and integrated Bar. In the years that have
elapsed since the writing of Mr. LePaulle's article, strong movements
7. In France in civil cases the possible penalty for perjury ranges from one to ten
years depending on circumstances, plus a fine and loss of certain civil rights, etc., for a
stipulated period. FRENCH PENAL CODE arts. 363, 364, 366. One of the factors considered
by the French in determining the applicable penalty is whether the perjury was the result
of bribery. In cases before the Cour d'Assises (where the more serious criminal infractions
are tried), if a defendant has been condemned to imprisonment for more than five to ten
years, persons who falsely testified against him are subject to the same punishment he
received. FRENCH PENAL CODE art. 361.
8. For an interesting informal discussion of the perjury problem in France, see Perrod,
La Foire aux Preuves, LECTURES POUR Tous 9, 11 (July 1964).

CIVIL JUSTICE

to achieve these objectives have had considerable success, notably the
efforts of the American Bar Association and the American Judicature
Society.
The LePaulle recommendations quite naturally reflect their author's
frame of reference, the French system for fact-finding and law-applying.
In addition to sparking insight as to American institutions, they afford a
point of departure for a brief American's-eye view of administration of
civil justice in France.'
FRANCE

Judicial System and Legal Professions
The tribunaux de grande instance are the French noncriminal
courts most closely resembling our trial courts of general jurisdiction,"
and therefore the following discussion will center upon practice and
procedure in these courts. It should be noted, however, that in addition to the tribunaux de grande instance, there are the tribunaux
d'instance" (resembling our small claims courts) and a number of
specialized courts. Among the latter are the very important tribunaux
de commerce, which have exercised extensive jurisdiction over commercial transactions since pre-revolutionary days. 2 In modern times,
9. For some discussions in English concerning the French judicial system, see: DAVID &
LEGAL SYSTEM (1958); Dainow, The Constitutional and Judicial
Organization of France and Germany and some Comparisons oj the Civil Law and Common
Law Systems, 37 IND. L.J. 1, 9 (1961); Deik & Rheinstein, The Machinery of Law Administration in France and Germany, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 846 (1936); Kock, The Machinery
of Law Administration in France, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 366 (1960); Pugh, Administration of
Criminal Justice in France: An Introductory Analysis, 23 LA. L. REV. 1 (1962).
For some materials in English on aspects of French civil procedure and evidence
generally, see: Anton, Scottish Thoughts on French Civil Procedure, I (N.S.) Juam. REV.
158 (1956); BODINOTON, FRENcIH LAW OF EVIDENCE (1904); Giverdon, The Problem of
Proof in French Civil Law, 31 TUL. L. REV. 29 (1956); Hammelmann, Expert Evidence, 10
MODERN L. REV. 32 (1947); Hamson, Civil Procedurein France and England, 10 CAiB. L.J.
411 (1950); Hamson, English and French Legal Methods: The Civil Process, 67 JuPm. REV.
188 (1955); Herzog, Proof of Facts in French Civil Procedure: The Reforms of 1958
and 1960, 10 AM. J. ComP. L. 169 (1961); Howard, Compensation in French Criminal Procedure, 21 MODERN L. REV. 387 (1958); PLANIOL, TRAiAr ILimENTAIRE DE Dnorr CIVIL,
Vol. 2, Part 1, First Part (Proof) (11th ed. 1939), English translation by the Louisiana
State Law Institute (1959); Tyndale, The Organization and Administration of Justice in
France, with an Outline of French Procedure with Respect to the Production of Evidence,
13 CAN. B. REV. 567 and 655 (1935); Wright, French and English Civil Procedure, 42 L.Q.
REV. 327 and 502 (1926).
For an excellent French pricis, see CUCHE ET VINCENT, PROCDURE CIE, (13th ed.
Dalloz Pr6cis, 1963) [hereafter cited as CUCHE ET VINCENT]. For more comprehensive
treatment, see the very authoritative SoLus ET PERROT, DROIT JUDICIAnE PRIVk, Vol. 1
(1961).
10. For discussion of the organization and jurisdiction of the tribunaux de grande
instance, see CUCHE FT VINCENT, nos. 86, 91-97, 201, 255.
11. For discussion of the organization and jurisdiction of the tribunaux d'instance,
see CucHE ET VINCENT, nos. 106-107, 212-215, 256.
12. For discussion of the history, organization and jurisdiction of the tribunaux de
commerce, see CUCHE ET VINCENT, nos. 108-111. Others of these specialized courts include
conseils des prudhommes (industrial councils), discussed CUC3E ET VINCENT, nos. 112-121;
DEVRIES, THE FREcNC

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XIX

apparently in part as a consequence of the desire to expedite litigation,"
a number of new specialized courts have been established. However, the
resulting jurisdictional fragmentation, a problem not unknown to the
United States, is the subject of considerable concern. 4
Procedural formalities governing the tribunaux de grande instance
are generally more rigorous than those governing the other courts of
original jurisdiction. 5 This is, of course, understandable in light of the
small-claims character of the tribunaux d'instance, and the fact that
generally the specialized courts are staffed, at least in part, by lay
judges elected by those groups particularly affected by their various
specialized jurisdictions. 6
Except for the tribunal d'instance (which is presided over by
a single professional judge), and its counterpart for minor criminal
cases, a session of a French court is generally presided over by at
least three judges. The multi-judge approach is regarded as a basic
principle of French justice-insuring, it is felt, well-considered, impartial
decision-making. 7 However, many incidental proceedings in which
evidence is taken, documents examined, etc., are presided over by a
single judge named for that purpose.
The jury is perhaps the most significant single factor distinguishing
French and American civil procedural systems. Its presence in our law
shaped and moulded many of our characteristic procedural features.
Similarly, its complete absence from French civil procedure strongly
influenced French adjective law. American civil jury enthusiasts may
be surprised to learn that the institution excites practically no enthusiasm
in freedom-loving France. Mr. LePaulle's views concerning it, noted
above, are not atypical. A leading treatise on French civil procedure
states, in passing, that proposals to institute jury trials for French civil
cases have never been taken seriously. 8 The lay judges of the specialized courts provide the most analogous counterparts to our jurymen,
affording at least some lay participation in aspects of the judicial
process. It should be reemphasized, however, that the lay judge is a
specialist, not the ordinary "man in the street" of our juries.
The French -magistrature9 comprises both judges (magistrature
commissions de sicurit6 social (social security commissions), discussed CucHE -r VINCENT,
nos. 122, 122bis, 122ter; juridictions des logers (rent courts), discussed CuCHE ET VINCENT,
nos. 123-125.
13. See CUCHE ET VINCENT, no. 86.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.
16. See note 12 supra.
17. CucHrE ET VINCENT, no. 85.
18. CUcHE ET VINCENT, no. 87.

19. For further discussion of the French magistrature, see Pugh, Administration of
Criminal Justice in France: An Introductory Analysis, 23 LA. L. Rav. 1, 6 (1962) and
authorities therein cited.
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assise, seated magistrates) and public attorneys (magistrature debout,
standing magistrates) corresponding very roughly to our district attorneys and attorneys general). Interchange between the two branches
of the magistrature is quite possible. Entry, generally, is by rigorous
competitive examination, usually shortly after completion of law school.
In 1958 a three-year intensive training course for those successfully
completing the competitive examination was established.20 It should
be underlined, however, that the French magistrat, whether judge or
public attorney, is a career official, a member of a separate legal profession. He is not, and generally never has been, a regular avocat or
avoug (rough counterparts to our general practitioner). The French
judge is a member of an elite, highly selective group of non-political
governmental officials and enjoys high respect, both for his ability and
for his impartiality. Although less the activist, less the well-known public
figure than his American counterpart, his powers are broad. If it were not
for his high caliber, independence, impartiality, and political detachment,
the French might be more interested in adopting civil jury trials.
The problem of delay which so plagues the administration of civil justice in the United States is also a problem of great significance in France.
Whereas French criminal procedure is essentially inquisitorial in nature, 1
civil proceedings are basically adversary. French judges take a much
more passive role in civil than in criminal proceedings. Despite recent
reforms, French judges seem quite disinclined to take it upon themselves
to expedite civil litigation, and thus generally exert much less control
in this regard than many of the more delay-conscious American judges.22
This, as well as the fact that many of the incidental proceedings in
French civil litigation are not open to the public, may reflect a basic
feeling in France that civil litigation is a rather private matter, and
that the state as well as the public should not unduly interfere or
intrude.
Personal injury suits constitute a relatively small percentage of
French civil litigation. As the result of a very interesting procedure,
a personal injury claim is often adjudicated as an incident of the
criminal case growing out of the accident giving rise to the civil
claim. 3 The ever-increasing number of personal injury claims, resulting from our automotive age, does not cause the same clogging of civil
dockets in France that it does in the United States. In France, anyone
who has personally suffered as the result of damage directly caused by
20. Ordinance 58:1270 of December 22, 1958.
21. See Pugh, Administration of Criminal Justice in France: An Introductory Analysis,
23 LA. L. REv. 1,. 10 et seq. (1962).
22. See CUCHE ET VINCENT, nos. 290, 317.
23. See Howard, Compensation in French Criminal Procedure, 21 MODERN L. Rzv. 387
(1958); Pugh, Administration of Criminal Justice in France: An Introductory Analysis,
23 LA. L. REv. 1, 12 (1962) and authorities therein cited.
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an infraction of the criminal law has a civil action for relief.2 4 This
cause of action may be asserted by the injured party as an incident of
the criminal case, or in a separate civil proceeding.25 In practice, it appears that in most instances the injured party will choose to assert his
claim in the criminal proceeding. In this way he can take advantage
of the essentially inquisitorial aspects of French criminal justice, the
state's investigatory procedures, the presentation by the public attorney,
and the relative speed, economy, and more liberal rules of evidence
which characterize French criminal proceedings. In addition, he has the
psychological advantage of having his antagonist in the role of a
criminally accused. Frequently the civil action aspects of French criminal
proceedings are more important than the criminal. France has both a
comparative negligence system and compulsory unlimited insurance
coverage. It frequently happens, therefore, that in a criminal trial growing out of an automobile accident, the insurance companies for both the
defendant and the civil party plaintiff, through their defense of their
policyholders, are de facto participants.
Despite the absence in France of the contingency fee contract,"
the cost of civil litigation appears high. This results in part from the
fact that compared to our own, the French legal profession is quite
fragmentized.2 7 There is no single counterpart in France to the American lawyer; instead, aspects of his role are performed by various
separate professions, only some of which will be discussed here.
The avocat, who corresponds very roughly to the English barrister,
possesses, with minor exceptions, the exclusive right to argue cases on
behalf of clients before the tribunaux de grande instance and the cours
d'appel (courts of appeal) .2 " He also has the right (although not the
exclusive right) to argue cases before practically all other French tribunals. Traditionally, the avocat's role is to speak on behalf of the
client, not to represent him. The avocat is generally a highly cultured,
very articulate individual-a member of an elite, well organized, selfdisciplined, and quite autonomous profession, whose traditions go back
to the fourteenth century.
Before the tribunaux de grande instance and the cours d'appel,
a person must have an avoud (who corresponds very roughly to the
24. FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 2.
25. FRENCH CODE OF CIMINAL PROCEDURE arts. 3,

4.
26. See LePaulle, Law Practice in France, 50 COLuem. L. Rav. 945, 952 (1950);

ENCYCLOP]LDIE DALLOZ, PROC*DURE CIVILE, 1955, Avocat, no.
FORmULAIRE DES PARQUETS ET DE LA POLICE JUDICIAIRE, 1954,

205; lePoittevin, DICTIONNAIRE
Tome I, Avocat, no. 11.
27. For discussion of the legal profession in France, see: LePaulle, Law Practice in
France, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 945 (1950); Pugh, Administration of Criminal Justice in

France: An Introductory Analysis, 23 LA. L. REv. 1, 6-10 (1962) and authorities therein
cited.
28. For discussion of the history, prerogatives, and disabilities of the avocat, see CucHE
ET VINCENT, nos. 170-181.
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English solicitor), and it is the avoug who represents him.29 Although an
ordinary litigant may argue his case in proper person, and thus in theory
does not need the services of an avocat, he must be represented by an
avouJ. ° In these courts it is the avouJ who has the exclusive right to
represent and plead in writing. In practice it appears that often the
pleadings are drafted originally by the avocat, and given to the avoug
for his approval and signature. A litigant in one of the tribunaux de
grande instance thus normally needs the services of both an avoug
(to represent him and plead in writing) and an avocat (to speak in his
behalf).
A litigant must also employ the services of another professional,
the huissier de justice, who enjoys certain exclusive rights relative to
service, and plays a very important role with respect to verification of
facts and enforcement of judgments."'
If the case is appealed to a cour d'appel (where a trial de novo is
available), another avouW must be employed, for an avou's exclusive
prerogatives extend only to the court to which he is attached. If the
case is to be taken to France's highest court, the Cour de cassation, the
client generally must employ still another individual, an avocat a la
Cour de cassation, who, however, handles both oral argument and written pleading before that tribunal.3"
Although the French system no doubt produces specialists of outstanding ability, it appears to this observer to result in undue duplication
of effort, and unnecessary expense. Both the avocat and avouW are the
beneficiaries, and to some extent the captives, of centuries of tradition.
They enjoy high social and economic standing. Today the distinctions
between avocat and avouJ are less rigorous than previously,"3 and for
many years there has been talk of eliminating the avocat-avouW dichotomy. However, there are powerful counterweights in economic factors 84 and proud tradition.
An amelioration of the expense element of French litigation is a
pervasive legal aid system for those meeting the financial test.85 Of
29. The state and certain governmental agencies, however, may be represented by the
public ministry. CucHE ET VINCENT, no. 318. For discussion of the avoul and his profession,
see CUCHE ET VINCENT, nos. 182-185bis, 187-189.
30. See CUCHE ET VINCENT, nos. 178, 187, 302, 318.

31. CucHE ET VINCENT, no. 191.
32. For discussion of the avocat d la Cour de cassation, see CUCHE ET VINCENT, no. 190.
33. See CUCHE ET VINCENT, nos. 177bis-178.

34. It is generally felt that to effect such a merger, the government would have to
remunerate the avous for the loss of their monopoly or exclusive right to perform certain
functions, for the avoui's right is acquired only after remuneration of his predecessor or
predecessor's estate. It is considered, therefore, that the reform would carry a very high
price tag.
35. For a very interesting discussion of the French legal aid system, see Cucnx ET
VINCENT, nos. 592-604.
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very ancient origins, the system was developed under the influence of
the ecclesiastical courts. It extends to all indigents (plaintiff or defendant), for all causes of action, before all courts (civil, administrative, and
criminal, affording at least temporary relief against the payment of all
fees (filing, avou6, avocat, huissier, appeal, etc.). Legal aid bureaus
throughout the country, staffed by members from the legal professions
and governmental officials, administer the system. There is a bureau
for each tribunalde grande instance, each cour d'appel, and the Cour de

cassation. If the bureau decides favorably on the application for legal
aid, the indigent is assigned an avocat, an avou6, and a huissier by the
local titular heads of these professions. An appeal from the decision of
the local bureau to the next higher bureau in the legal aid hierarchy is
possible, but only on the initiative of the representative of the public
ministry.
The French legal aid system is worthy of our study, and perhaps,
emulation. Recent developments in the United States in the criminal
area are well known, but we have not done nearly enough to afford
representation for the indigent in civil litigation. The contingency fee
contract, a practice prohibited in France,"6 makes it possible for an
indigent with a good money claim to secure counsel-at a percentage fee
that may at times seems unconscionable. This, has taken off much
of the "pressure" that otherwise would have built up. But what of the
indigent plaintiff whose claim is small, or does not otherwise lend itself
to the contingency fee device; what of the indigent defendant in an
eviction case, in the usual chattel mortgage foreclosure case, etc.? Although in many areas of our country, legal aid organizations are doing
fine work, there is much more to be done if everyone is to have his
"day in court."
Pleading, Service, Docketing, and Joinder of Issue

In France, as in the United States, a great many procedural reforms have been adopted during the last thirty years.17 Nevertheless,
French civil procedure continues in large measure to be governed by
one of the Napoleonic codes, the Code of Civil Procedure (1806), which
itself was strongly influenced by the Ordonnance de 1667. As might be
anticipated, French and American adjective law differ widely.
Before a brief examination of some of the more detailed aspects
of French civil procedure, it should be noted that in France there is
no real counterpart to the American trial; there is no single continuous
hearing in which all of the testimony and all of the documents are presented in open court. In France, the final argument is based not upon
evidence adduced at an immediately preceding hearing, but upon dos36. See note 26 supra.
37. CUcHE ET VICCENT, no. 6.
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siers (or case records) containing pleadings, documentary evidence,
etc.8 8 Of particular significance, a dossier often contains the written
summations of the various incidental proceedings, or separate compartmentalized hearings or investigations, that may have been held in order
to develop and clarify certain aspects of the case.
The first pleading in a French civil proceeding is a document
(l'exploit d'ajournement) containing a statement of the demand or
claim, and the name of plaintiff's avoug, his agent and representative with
respect to the cause.89 A copy of the exploit d'ajournement is served by
a huissier.4 ° It should be noted that at this stage nothing is filed with
the court as in American procedure. Filing comes later.
If the defendant is domiciled in France, service may be either personal or domiciliary.4 1 Domiciliary service may be accomplished by
service on a servant, a relative, or even a neighbor if he is willing to
undertake delivery of the document. 2 If the neighbor refuses, and apparently he normally does, the exploit is to be served upon a designated
local official and the huissier must so notify defendant by registered
mail.
From the exploit d'ajournement forward, there is what is known
as instruction, which is divided into two distinct phases.48 During the
first phase, culminating in the audience for the joinder of issue (when
the claim and answer are submitted in open court without argument),
technical procedural matters not going to the merits are considered.
During the second phase, including the final audience (when the case
is argued by the avocats on the record that has been developed), the
merits of the case are clarified and developed by incidental proceedings
and the parties refine their contentions and attempt to produce evidentiary justification.
Within the period stipulated by the initial pleading (l'exploit
d'ajournement), usually a week, the defendant is to secure the services
38. Both plaintiff and defendant compile dossiers. Also, since 1935, there is a dossier (or
court record) compiled by the greffier (or clerk of court). CuCHE ET VINCENT, nos. 317, 320.
39. CUCHE ET VINCENT, nos. 311-313. The exploit d'ajournement contains, inter alia,
the date; the name, profession and domicile of the plaintiff; name, domicile and official
enrollment number of the huissier; name and residence of the defendant; name of person
on whom copy of l'exploit is served; the court before whom the defendant is required to
appear; delay allowed by law (generally a week) during which defendant must retain an
avoui who within this time must notify the plaintiff's avoud of his designation.
40. Service may also be made by the huissier's clerk. For the formalities regulating
service (signification), see CUcHE ET VINCENT, nos. 314-316. The original of the exploit
d'ajournement is retained by the huissier for inclusion in plaintiff's dossier. CucHE ETrVINCENT, no. 312.
41. Service may not be made between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
42. In such cases, to insure secrecy and discourage gossip, the law requires that the
exploit d'ajournement be enclosed in an envelope sealed with the seal of the huissier, and
aside from this, manifesting nothing other than the name and address of the defendant.
43. CUCEL ET VINCEr, nos. 290, 317.
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of an avoug who in turn is to notify plaintiff's avoug in writing of his
selection."' Otherwise, a default judgment might ensue. To docket the
case, plaintiff's avou6 then files with the clerk of court a placet, a document consisting essentially of a copy of the statement of plaintiff's demand or claim.45 The case is assigned to a division of the court, and the
clerk begins assembling the case record or dossier."
At the time the case is docketed, a judge is designated as the
magistrate who will have the obligation of supervising this particular
case (le juge charg4 de suivre la procedure). 7 This procedural institution, inaugurated in 1935, departs somewhat from the multiple-judge
aspect of French justice; it was instituted, however, as a means of
expediting litigation. In order that this judge may be kept abreast of proceedings, copies of pertinent documents must be filed with the clerk for
inclusion in the dossier." By assigning to each case a judge charged with
keeping abreast of proceedings, and giving him extensive powers, it
was hoped that French civil actions might proceed more rapidly. Results, however, have been quite disappointing. If the role envisioned for
the juge charg6 de suivre la procddure were fully implemented, French
civil justice could indeed be dispensed with greater speed. Inter alia,
he is authorized, during the earlier stages of litigation, to request the
parties to appear before him in an effort to achieve a compromise. If an
accord is thus reached, it can be reduced to writing and made executory.
He can call the avougs together at any time to discuss the progress of
the case. He has the power within certain limitations to order incidental
proceedings to develop and clarify certain aspects of the litigation. At
the final audience, he shall report in open court on the entire history of
the case, without, however, giving his opinion on the merits. These powers
are by no means fully utilized, due apparently to a number of factorsincluding traditional passivity of the French magistrat in civil cases,
procedural inertia, and overwork. The institution, however, and the
continued efforts to make it truly effective are extremely interesting.
The nearest American counterpart seems to be the role of the American
judge in our "pretrial procedure." The American judge, however, by
tradition is much more the activist and much more likely to take a firm
hand in expediting matters than his French counterpart.
After the case is docketed, plaintiff's avoul, by a document known
as an avenir, gives defendant's avou6 at least two weeks notice of the
date on which the claim and answer (conclusions) are to be presented
44. CUCHE ET VINCENT, no. 318. It should be noted that it appears that this delay
and many of the others stipulated by law are not assiduously followed in practice.
45. CUCHE ET VINCENT, no. 319. If the plaintiff fails to docket the case timely, defendant's avoud may do so.
46. CUCHE ET VINCENT, no. 320.
47. For general discussion of the juge chargi de suivre la procidure, see CUCHE ET
VINCENT, nos. 290, 317, 320, 330-331.
48. CuCHE ET VINCENT, no. 332.
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to the three-judge tribunal in open court, the audience for the joinder
of issue. Within a two-week period from this notification, plaintiff's
avouJ is to be served with a copy of defendant's answer. At the day
fixed for the audience, both plaintiff and defendant present their conclusions (claim and answer) in open court to the three-judge tribunal,
which ultimately will decide the case. There is no oral presentation to
the court at this time. Although the conclusions may subsequently be
amended in certain respects, they fix the jurisdiction of the court and the
amount of the claim. 9 In this way, issue is joined.
Development and Clarification of the Facts
After the first audience, the second phase commences, wherein the
parties are to grapple on the merits. During this phase, generally the
defendant may no longer raise exceptions and objections not going to
the merits of the plaintiff's claim."
As noted above, instead of being adduced in one continuous hearing
immediately before the closing argument, the facts are usually developed
and clarified via episodic, compartmentalized, incidental proceedings.
In any one case, there may be a number of such proceedings, touching
different aspects of the case, and using different kinds of proof-written,
oral, expert inquiry, etc. In contrast to criminal proceedings, 5 ' the rules of
evidence governing cases before the tribunaux de grande instance are
extremely technical.5" Also technical and formalistic are the procedural
rules regulating the various kinds of incidental hearings, patterned in
large measure after procedures evolved during the latter half of the
seventeenth century." It has been suggested that one of the reasons
underlying the rigorous evidentiary requirements for civil cases is the
traditional desire of French landowners to protect their interests from
fraudulent claims.
Generally, proof of civil transactions involving more than fifty new
francs (or approximately ten dollars) must be by notarial act or by
act under private signature.54 This rule does not apply to transactions
which under French law are considered "commercial," 55 to torts and
quasi-contracts, nor to cases in which it is deemed that there was a
moral impossibility for the parties to secure the required documenta49. The court may not award plaintiff more than he has thus prayed for.
50. CUCHE ET VINCENT, nos. 323, 507. No discussion will here be attempted as to the
possible procedural exceptions and objections, but it should be noted that their disposition
may well have required considerable time.

51. See Pugh, Administration of Criminal Justice in France: An Introductory
Analysis, 23 LA. L. Rav. 1 (1962).
52. For discussion of the rules of evidence and proceedings for developing and
clarifying the evidence, see CUcHE ET VINcaT, nos. 508-547.
53. CucHE ET VINCENr, no. 510.
54. FRENCH C=vn. CoDE art. 1341.

55. Ibid.
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tion.5" The rule is also relaxed when there is a commencement of proof
by writing (commencement de preuve par ecrit),1 7 an exception which
has been given a very broad interpretation by the jurisprudence. The
rigorous documentation requirement can be successfully evaded if the
court in its discretion orders a hearing for the personal appearance of the
parties for questioning (comparution personnelle). s Although not under
oath, the parties' statements when summarized in writing by the court,
constitute commencement of proof by writing. 9
After issue is joined, a litigant is obligated to acquaint his opponent
with all documents he intends to use in his own behalf in the proceedings." o Generally, this is done completely without question, and thus
the "surprise" element is decreased considerably. If a litigant fails to
comply with his obligation in this regard, and this appears to be quite
rare, there is a means by which he may be forced to do so (exception de
communication de pieces).6' Although it is quite clear that there is also
a way by which a notary or other public officer may be forced to produce
a relevant document, it is not completely clear that a private third party
may be compelled to do so. Nor is it clear that an adversary can be
forced to produce a document which might well be of assistance to his
opponent. 2 In any event, it appears that the French have by no means
developed deposition and discovery procedures to the extent now current
in American practice.
Primary contemporary written documentation of a litigant's claim
may be either of two kinds-authentic acts 8 and acts under private
signature."'
Authentic acts are those executed according to prescribed formalities
before designated public officials-particularly the very important notaire (or notary), a member of a separate, distinct, and very respected
legal profession. Authentic acts are generally self-proving,6 5 and to a
remarkable extent, constitute full proof of the facts to which the notary
56. FRENcu Civu CODE art. 1348; Giverdon, The Problem of Proof in French Civil Law,
31 TuL. L. REv. 29, 32-33 (1956).

57. FRENcH Civm CODE art. 1347.
58. Giverdon, The Problem of Proof in French Civil Law, 31 TiL. L. REV. 29, 33
(1956); CUCHE ET VINCENT, nos. 534-538.
59. If a party fails to appear for the comparution personnelle, or remains silent in
the face of questioning, this also may be considered as the equivalent of a commencement
of proof by writing. See CUCHE ET VINCENT, no. 537.
60. CUCmx ET VINCENT, no. 324.
61. CUCHE ET VINCENT, no. 506.
62. See CucHE ET VINCENT, no. 512.
63. PLANIoL, TRAIT RLAMENTAIRE DE Dsorr Civm, Vol. 2, Part 1, First Part (Proof)

(11th ed. 1939), English translation by the Louisiana State Law Institute (1959),
80-93.

64. Id. at nos. 57-79.
65. Id. at no. 88.
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has personally and officially attested.16 A litigant wishing to contest the
full proof aspects of an authentic act must undertake a very complex,
perilous, and rarely used procedure, which is permitted only in the discre-

tion of the court (inscription de faux).6
If a party wishes to make use of an act under private signature,
purportedly emanating from his opponent, he may call upon the opponent
to admit or deny its authenticity." If the opponent admits the genuineness of the document, or refuses to affirm or deny it, then the verity of
the document is established, for the failure to deny one's purported sig-

nature is taken as an affirmance. If the opponent denies the signature, the
court, in its discretion, may nonetheless accept the document as valid,
may accept the denial as valid, or may order one or more incidental

proceedings to inquire into the verity of the document (vgrification
d'critures).69 Thus, the document is either verified or not verified, and
accordingly is either available or not available to establish the proponent's case. 70
In the discretion of the court, on request of one of the parties or on
its own motion, testimony of witnesses as to one or more of the factual
issues in a case may be received via incidental proceedings known as
enqu~tes. It should be reemphasized that the parties do not have the right
to have the testimony of witnesses taken; the matter is discretionary.71
Although the procedural rules governing these enquites were considerably
66. See PLANIOL, TRArri I9LMENTAmE DE Doir CIVIL, Vol. 2, Part 1, First Part (Proof)
(11th ed. 1939), English translation by the Louisiana State Law Institute (1959), no. 90,
wherein it is stated:
When the fact announced in the act is affirmed by the public officer who drafted it
as having been accomplished by himself, or as having taken place in his presence,
the declaration is given faith until an "inscription de faux". . . . The reason for
this is that the sincerity of the public officer is guaranteed: (1) By the conditions
prior to his nomination which assure to the functions of which he is charged,
a recruitment as good as possible; and (2) by the terrible consequences for him of
a forgery committed in the exercise of his functions: loss of his place and functions,
and conviction to hard labor for life. The public officer who drafts an authentic
act is therefore a privileged witness, whose attestation in the eyes of the law
has an exceptional value. (Footnotes omitted.)
67. CucuE

ET VINCENT,

nos.

519-521;

PLANIOL,

TRAITE

RL]mENTAImE

DE

Daorr

Cvim, Vol. 2, Part 1, First Part (Proof) (11th ed. 1939), English translation by the
Louisiana State Law Institute (1959), nos. 83-86.
68. CucHE ET VINCENT, nos. 513-518; PLANIOL, TRArri PLEMENTAME DE DRorr Cvn.,
Vol. 2, Part 1, First Part (Proof) (11th ed. 1939), English translation by the Louisiana
State Law Institute (1959), nos. 67-79.
69. Such proceedings include, in the discretion of the court, one or more of the following methods: by thtres (when the contents of the contested documents are related in other
acts whose authenticity is not contested; by witnesses (who, for example, saw the document in question signed, or who are familiar with the signature); or by submission to a
panel of three experts.
70. If as a result of incidental proceedings, the authenticity of the document is rejected, the proponent is liable for costs and damages. If on the other hand, the court finds
that the opponent falsely denied his own signature, he is liable for costs, damages and a
fine.

71. For rules governing these proceedings, see

CUCHE Er VINCENT,

nos. 522-533.
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liberalized by reform legislation in 1958, they nonetheless remain very
technical. Since 1958, the three-judge tribunal may itself hear the witnesses, but in general the testimony continues to be taken as formerly,
either before a judge designated by the court for this purpose, or before
the juge charge de suivre la procedure.72 The proceeding need not be
open to the public, and often is not. The judge is in control of the hearing, and alone has the right to question the witnesses. Although a party
may request the judge to ask the witnesses certain questions, the law
stipulates that a party may not himself directly question the witnesses,
under pain of fine and exclusion from the hearing. 7 The witnesses may
be heard individually, or confronted with each other or with the parties.
A proc~s-verbal is generally made of the hearing, containing written
summaries (not a verbatim transcript) of the testimony of the witnesses,
dictated by the presiding judge.74 Thus, the three-judge tribunal generally
obtains oral testimony of the witnesses not by seeing and hearing them,
but by procds-verbaux included in the dossier.
Rigorous rules regulate testimonial competency; interest, infamy,
and infancy still play an important role. Except under exceptional procedures (serment ddcisoire and serment supplitoire),' the parties themselves are not sworn, and because of the interest disqualification, they do
not testify as witnesses. There is a prescribed procedure, however, by
which the three-judge tribunal in its discretion may itself interrogate the
parties without putting them to the oath (comparution personnelle).76
The interest disqualification also generally bars the sworn testimony of a
party's spouse, ascendants and descendants. Certain persons because of
their criminal record may not testify under oath, but their unsworn statements may be received. Children under fifteen years of age may not give
testimony under oath, but again, their unsworn testimony may be accepted. Although strange to a present-day American observer, in light of
our current practices, it should be noted that until relatively recently,
similar grounds for incompetency prevailed in the United States.
On motion of a party or on its own motion, the three-judge tribunal
in its discretion may order an incidental proceeding known as a comparution personnelle.77 This permits the court to interrogate the parties without putting them to the oath. In such event, as noted previously, the
72. It should be noted that the juge chargi de suivre la procddure, on his own motion
or on motion of a party, may himself order the holding of an enqugte, in which event he
is to preside over the hearing. CucHa ET VINcENT, nos. 331, 523.
73. CUC3E

ET VINCENT,

no.

528;

FRENCH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

art. 265.

74. A witness is read the summary of his testimony thus prepared, and if he wishes to
make changes, these are inserted in the margin or at the end of the written statement. He
is invited to sign it. If he does not wish to sign it, or cannot, mention thereof is to be
made in the procas-verba.

75. See discussion of serment ddcisoire and serment suppl~toire, infra.
76. See discussion of comparution personnelle, infra.
77. CUCHE

ET VINCENT,

nos. 534-538.
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unsworn testimony of the parties (or even their refusal to appear or
testify) suffices to meet the requirement of commencement of proof by
writing. Although assisted by their avocats, who have the right to request
the court to ask certain questions, the parties are interrogated by the
court itself in a closed proceeding. The parties may be examined consecutively or collectively.7" A prac~s-verbal similar to that prepared at
an enqudte when ordinary witnesses are heard is confected. There is no
verbatim record of the proceedings.
There is an interesting, but very seldomly employed procedure,
by which one of the parties may call upon his opponent to take the
serment ddcisoire (or decisory oath).7" This affords a party with a meritorious claim and a scrupulous opponent an opportunity to carry the day,
even in the absence of usual evidentiary requirements. If the opponent
takes the oath, both the proponent and the court are bound by the solemn
declaration, for the oath is indeed decisory. There is another procedure
by which the judge in his discretion, in order to bolster the evidence of a
party with a meritorious claim but insufficient proof, may invite him to
take a supplementary oath (serment supplgtoire).1° This oath is to be
distinguished from the decisory oath; it does not bind the court.
Either the three-judge tribunal or the juge chargJ de suivre la
procddure, on motion of a party or on its own motion, may order an
expertise (expert investigation) as to technical aspects of a case.81
Whether experts are to be named, and if so, who is to be named, is generally a matter of discretion.82 The order providing for the expertise itself
designates who is to make the investigation and the time within which
the report is to be submitted. 8 The parties and the juge chargg de suivre
la proc&dure are entitled to be present when the expert investigation is
made. Although the expert may question persons he feels may be of
assistance, if he wishes to receive the benefit of sworn testimony, he is to
address a request for same to the juge charg6 de suivre la procedure. The
formal report is filed with the grefier (or clerk of court). If more than
one expert has been appointed, and the experts are not unanimous in their
opinion, the report is to note the divergence-with no indication, however,
as to which of the experts held the majority or minority view. The court
78. They may also be examined in the absence of each other.
79. CUCHE ET VINCENT, no. 539; PLANIOL, TRAITE RLEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVL, Vol. 2,
Part 1, First Part (Proof) (11th ed. 1939), English translation by the Louisiana State Law
Institute (1959), nos. 31-34; SoLus, CouRs DE DROIT JUDICIAIRE PRriv (PROCADURE CIVILE)
565-66 (1961-62); FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 1357-1369.
80. Ibid.
81. Cucx ET VINCENT, nos. 541-546; Hammelmann, Expert Evidence, 10 MODERN L.
REV. 32 (1947).
82. The law stipulates, however, that unless the court deems it necessary to name three
experts, only one shall be named. This provision came into the law in 1944, to minimize
expense.
83. There is a means by which the parties may attempt to recuse a designated expert.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL.. XIX

is not bound by the report. If it feels that a second expertise on the same
subject matter would be beneficial, it may so order.84
It appears that in practice expertises are quite frequently ordered,
and the French seem generally satisfied with the system. The expert
investigation often entails considerable delay, however, and this element
provokes criticism. It should be emphasized that an expertise is an
incidental proceeding designed to produce a written report of an investigation conducted by an impartial expert for the use of the court in its
determination of the facts. This is in sharp contrast to our battle of
experts with examination and cross-examination in open court.
The court, on its own motion or motion of a party, may decide that
a judge or the three-judge tribunal itself should go to the scene which
has given rise to a factual controversy. In such event, a distinct incidental
proceeding is ordered, descente sur les lieux (or visit to the scene). 8"
Accompanied by the clerk of court, and the parties if they desire, the
judge or judges go to the scene, question any persons there they deem
helpful, and make whatever investigations they think appropriate. A
procks-verbal of the proceeding is prepared for inclusion in the dossier.
Final Pleadings, Argument by Avocats
After completion of incidental proceedings for the development and
clarification of controverted factual issues, and after the parties have
exchanged amended written pleadings setting forth final positions as to
both fact and law (conclusions d~finitives), the juge chargg de suivre la
procedure convokes a conference with the avocats.80 At this conference,
the avocats are given a choice as to subsequent procedure.
The avocats may agree to present their case orally before the juge
ckargJ de suivre la procedure, a simplified and expeditious procedure
established in 1958. If they do, it is unnecessary for the case to wait
its turn on the docket. After hearing the avocats, the juge charg6 de
suivre la procddure transmits the case record to the president of the
three-judge tribunal which, after receiving the report on the cause by
the juge charg6 de suivre la proc~dure, will decide the case. This expeditious procedure bears some resemblance to the practice sometimes employed on appeal in the United States of submitting a case "on briefs,"
without oral argument.
If the parties do not agree to follow the new optional streamlined
procedure mentioned above, then the case will be presented in the traditional fashion before the three-judge tribunal itself. After the juge chargg
84. It appears, however, that this occurs only rarely.

83.

CUCHE ET VINCENT,

no. 540. Descente sur les lieux sometimes takes place instead of

an expertise, which may be ordered to accomplish much the same purpose.

86. For discussion of this and subsequent proceedings at the final audience, see CuCHE
nos. 325-328.
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de suivre la procgdure transmits the dossier to the president of the threejudge tribunal, the president assigns a date for hearing. To discourage
the avocats and avougs from postponing the case from the day fixed
(apparently a fairly frequent practice) the French devised a very ingenious procedure. Since 1958, the clerk of court has been given the duty of
sending a letter to the parties themselves directly informing them of the
day fixed for the hearing. 7 This, it was hoped, would provide a spur
which in turn would promote celerity.
At the hearing before the three-judge tribunal, the written pleadings
are first read-in a proceeding normally open to the public. The juge
charge de suivre la procedure then presents an oral report summarizing
the history of the litigation and the matters in controversy. He is not
permitted, however, to express his opinion on the merits. The avocats
make their presentations on both fact and law (plaidoirie), and the president of the court thereafter officially closes the adversary proceedings.
Of considerable interest, after the close of the adversary proceedings, the representative of the public ministry (minist~re public) is given
the opportunity to express his views."8 Generally in the tribunaux de
grande instance this official makes no more than a pro forma appearance,
but he has the right (and exceptionally, the obligation), to express himself on every case. 9 He acts somewhat as an official jurisconsult for the
court, appearing on behalf of society's interest and the proper application of the law." The parties have no right to respond orally to the presentation made by the public ministry. They may, however, submit
written memoranda to the court, and if the court feels that new and
important questions have thus been raised, it can order another hearing
wherein the avocats and the representative of the public ministry will
again be heard. The authority of the public ministry with respect to the
clarification of the law, is indeed great. Under certain circumstances, he
may invoke the powers of France's highest court, the Cour de cassation,
to declare a lower court's judgment erroneous-where the parties themselves have not made a timely attack. In such cases, the parties remain
bound by the prior judgment, but the misconception that otherwise
would have been engendered by the erroneous decision is effectively
erased.9" In view of the theoretical differences as to the force of prior
decisions in civil and common-law systems,9" it is quite interesting that
it is in France that such procedures are found.
87.

cUcHE ET VINCENT, no. 326.

88. CU HE ET VINCENT, nos. 160-164, 327.

89. In all cases before France's highest court, the Cour de cassation, a representative of
the public ministry is obligated to make a presentation. CUCHE ET VINCENT, no. 163.
90. See Pugh, Administration of Criminal Justice in France: An Introductory Analysis,
23 LA. L. REv. 1, 5 (1962) and authorities therein cited.
91. CUCH ET VINCENT, no. 468.
92. DAVID & DEVRIES, THE FRENcH LEcA. SYsTEm, 113-121 (1958).
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Appeal
As noted previously, France generally affords a plenary review by
the courts of appeal (cours d'appel) on both facts and law'4-what in
American terminology might be called a trial de novo. The procedure
on appeal is basically the same as that for the original proceeding in the
tribunal de grande instance. This plenary review by the cours d'appal
is to be distinguished from the power exercised by France's highest court,
the Cour de cassation-in general, the power to casser (break or set
aside) lower court decisions on matters of law alone, not to itself decide
the case. 4
In France, as in the United States, procedures for fact-finding and
law-applying are often time-consuming and expensive. Procedural reforms
of considerable significance have been, and are being, made in each country. Despite the wide differences that separate our two systems, each can
learn from the thoughts and experience of the other.
93. See CUCHE E' VINCENT, nos. 411-447bis.
94. CUCHE ET VINCENT, nos. 126-131; see Pugh, Administration of Criminal Justice in
France: An Introductory Analysis, 23 LA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1962) and authorities therein cited.

